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Abstract
This paper compares strategic abstention in ad hoc committees versus standing committees.
Ad hoc committees meeet only once and then dissolve, while standing committeesThe central
finding from this study is that most of the predictions of swing voter curse theory hold up in large
elections conducted under controlled laboratory conditions. There is significant abstention, and
significant balancing of partisans by uniformed voters; and vote balancing increases with the
partisan imbalance. Elections with no partisan imbalance successfully aggregate information
and lead to eﬃcient outcomes. Consistent with swing voter curse theory, this eﬃciency falls
oﬀ as partisan imbalance increases, but to a significantly greater extent than is predicted in
equilibrium. It is instructive to compare these findings in large elections with results from the
smaller elections reported in Battaglini et al. (2007). All of the qualitative results are the same,
concerning the comparative statics, balancing, and abstention. One slight diﬀerence is that
there was less (irrational) voting for a in the small elections than in the large elections, except
for the π = 5/9 m = 0 treatment, where we observed 20% voting for a in the small elections,
compared with 10% voting for a in the large elections. These diﬀerences were reflected in slightly
diﬀerent eﬃciency results between small and large elections, with the comparisons mirroring the
diﬀerences in voting for a: more (irrational) a voting results in lower eﬃciency. We conclude that
this scaled-up study successfully replicates the initial swing voter’s curse experiment reported in
Battaglini et al. (2007), obtaining very similar findings in laboratory committees that are three
times the size of those in the original study. The one caveat is that we found evidence of a slight
increase in irrational nonequilibrium behavior (voting for a) in the larger elections. Whether
this trend would continue as election size is further scaled up is an open question.a swing voter’s
curse environment
Recent advances in voting theory have shed light on the influence of pivotality on voter
choices when voters have asymmetric private information, and the implications of this for infor-
mation aggregation in committees and elections. Of particular interest is the result that voters
may optimally choose to vote contrary to their own private information even in committees or
elections where all voters share the same preferences (David Austen-Smith and Jeﬀrey Banks,
1996). A related insight is that abstention can occur even when voting is costless, as in the so-
called “Swing Voter’s Curse” literature (Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996).
The reason is that private signals give voters information about the marginal distribution of
states (given by voter signals), but what matters for an optimal decision is the distribution of
states conditional on a pivotal event. For example, the pivotal event under majority rule arises
when the aggregate votes of the other voters is either a tie or one vote away from a tie. These
conditional distributions can be much diﬀerent from the unconditional distribution of states. Be-
cause of these diﬀerences, some results are quite unintuitive and seem behaviorally implausible
at first blush. Because these results have important implications about information aggregation
and the eﬃciency of election outcomes and committee decisions (Feddersen and Pesendorfer
1997,1999), there is a need to test these theories, especially with respect to environments where
the predictions seem implausible.
More generally, the view that voters condition their choices of pivotality remains controver-
sial, especially among political scientists.1 Due to the many confounding factors, attempts to
test these theories by empirical study of voter behavior have been quite limited. For example,
a number of researchers have used historical and survey data to establish a correlation between
information and turnout (Thomas Palfrey and Keith Poole 1987, Thomas Coupe and Abdul
Noury 2004, Matthew Gentzkow 2005, and others), but establishing a causal link has been more
diﬃcult (Lassen 2005). Moreover, such a relationship might also be consistent with a more sim-
pler decision-theoretic model (Matsusaka (1995). As Lassen specifically points out (page 116),
observational data is not rich enough in variation nor provides researchers with enough controls
1See Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1996) critical point of view. Jeﬀrey Friedman (1996) contains a collection
of articles addressing this controversy, and Feddersen (2004) reviews related literature pertaining specifically to
abstention.
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to evaluate empirically the nuances of the pivotal voter approach and the laboratory may be the
only place where such a study is possible.
This diﬃculty suggests a valuable role for laboratory experiments, where confounding fac-
tors can be eliminated and the environment can be controlled in order to obtain separation
between the predictions of equilibrium theories based on game theory and pivotality versus
non-equilibrium theories based on traditional decision theory. A few experimental papers have
appeared in the literature in the last decade, testing pivotal voter models2, but many open ques-
tions remain, including questions about the generalizability of these findings to large elections.
This paper focuses squarely on the question of how these findings may change when the
number of voters is scaled up. Because these models are intended to apply to both relatively
small committees and mass elections (and everything in between), answering the scaling-up
question is essential to understanding the general applicability of the theory.
We explore the scaling-up question with respect to one specific application of the theory, the
Swing Voter’s Curse (SVC). The SVC refers to a situation in which a voter, conditioning on
being pivotal, may rationally choose to vote against his prior, or may abstain even if his prior
clearly favors a given alternative. To see why this may happen, imagine a situation in which
alternative a is superior to alternative b, given prior information. Assume that most voters
vote without observing which alternative is ex post superior (uninformed voters); some voters,
however, have access to a private signal which reveals the true state (informed voters). In this
case it is not possible that the uninformed voters, following their prior, vote for a. If this were
the case, an uninformed voter would indeed realize that, conditional on being pivotal, some
votes must be cast by informed voters (or else a would win for sure): this uninformed voter
would not vote for a, because b would certainly be a better alternative. As we will illustrate
below, by a similar argument, uninformed voters may choose to vote against their prior if they
know that there are partisan voters who would always favor a regardless of the state. In these
cases, therefore, the way voters make choices does not only depend on their preferences and
2See for example Serena Guarnaschelli, Richard McKelvey and Palfrey (2000), Marco Battaglini, Rebecca
Morton, and Palfrey (2007) and Jacob Goeree and Leeat Yariv (2007).
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their information, but also on the entire distribution of preferences and information.
Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey (2007) present the first experimental study of the Swing
Voter’s Curse and find significant evidence in support of the theory. They consider small com-
mittees (less than 10 voters), and find that uninformed swing voters abstain rather than cancel
out more informed voters, even though voting costs are zero. Even more striking, in asymmetric
environments, where there is partisan bias, these uninformed swing voters vote to oﬀset these
biases, even when their information says to vote in the same direction as the bias.
However, the experiments are conducted only on small commitees of seven swing voters and
generally 6 or fewer uninformed voters. In our scaled-up elections, we have between two and a
half and three times as many voters of all kinds in each electorate. Other experimental studies
have reported that voters in larger groups abstain with lower frequency than theory would
suggest, even when the theory is modified to allow for some behavioral limitations. For example,
Levine and Palfrey (2006) in a study of costly voting, for example, find that as they increase the
size of the voting population, turnout rates are higher than the predictions of the Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium and also quantal response equilibrium (MP1995). It may be that as the size of the
voting population increases, the predictions of the Swing Voter’s Curse are less supported in
the laboratory if swing voters participate more in such larger voting groups. However, we find
that even in the larger voting groups considerable support for the Swing Voter’s Curse and the
pivotal voter theory of information aggregation in committees and elections.
I The Model and Equilibrium
We consider a game with a set of N voters who deliberate by majority rule. There are two
alternative policies (or candidates) a, b and two states of the world, A and B. A number m < N
voters are partisans, who strictly prefer policy A regardless of the state. For convenience we
assume that m is even, n is odd and m ≤ n− 3.3The remaining voters are independents. These
voters share common preferences represented by a utility function u(x, θ) that is a function of
the state of the world θ ∈ {A,B} and the policy x ∈ {a, b}, where u(a,A) = u(b,B) = 1 and
3These assumptions are made only to simplify the notation.
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u(a,B) = u(b,A) = 0. State A has a prior probability π ≥ 12 . The true state of the world
is unknown, but each voter may receive an informative signal. We assume that signals of
diﬀerent agents are conditionally independent. The signal can take three values α, β, and ∅
with probabilities:
Pr(α|A) = Pr(β|B) = p and Pr(∅|A) = Pr(∅|B) = 1− p
A voter, therefore, is perfectly informed on the state of the world with probability p (i.e., observes
a or b) and has no information with probability 1− p (i.e., observes ∅).
After voters have seen their private signal, all voters vote simultaneously. Each voter can
vote for a, vote for b, or abstain (φ), and voting is costless. Partisans always vote for a. In any
equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies, an independent who receives an α signal votes
for a, and an independent who receives a β signal votes for b. Therefore, in this model the only
potentially strategic voting comes from the uninformed independents. Let σa, σb, and σφ be the
probability that an uninformed agent votes for a, b, or abstains, respectively. An equilibrium
of this game is symmetric if agents with the same signal use the same strategy: σi = σ for all i.
We analyze symmetric equilibria in which agents do not use weakly dominated strategies and
we will refer to them simply as equilibria.
Battaglini, et al. (2007) characterizes the equilibria of the voting game, which is unique for
the experimental parameters. Formal derivations and proofs appear in Battaglini, Morton, and
Palfrey (2006). First consider the benchmark case in which all the voters have the same common
value, so m = 0. For this case, we have, σb = 0 for all values of π. For values of π suﬃciently
close to 12 and p suﬃciently large, we also have σa = 0, so all uninformed voters abstain. In the
experiment we choose parameters such that σa = σb = 0 when m = 0.
This equilibrium has a simple interpretation as a particular form of the Swing Voters’ Curse.
To see the intuition behind it, suppose the prior is π = 12 . If an uninformed voter were to choose
in isolation, he would be indiﬀerent between the two options a or b. When voting in a group,
however, he knows that with positive probability some other voter is informed. By voting, he
risks voting against this more informed voter. So, since he has the same preferences as this
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informed voter and he is otherwise indiﬀerent among the alternatives because he has no private
information on the state, he always finds it optimal to abstain. When the prior is π > 12 , the
problem of the voter is more complicated. In this case the swing voter’s curse is mitigated by
the fact that the prior favors one of the two alternatives. As before, the voter does not want
to vote against an informed voter. However, he is not sure that there is an informed voter: and
if no informed voter is voting, he strictly prefers alternative a since this is ex ante more likely.
Thus although the voter never finds it optimal to vote for b, he may find it optimal to vote for
a. The higher is π, the higher is the incentive to vote for a; the higher is p (i.e. the probability
that there are other informed voters), the lower is the incentive to vote. For any p, if π > 12 is
not too high, the voter abstains.
I.1 Partisan Bias
If m > 0, the analysis is more subtle. Now uninformed voters always have an incentive to vote
to balance out the partisans, who (from the standpoint of an independent) bias the outcome in
favor of a. The calculus now depends critically on the conditional state probabilities if there is
a tie. For example, if there is a tie, it means some of the independent voters have voted for b.
Hence, in any equilibrium, σb > 0: i.e., uninformed voters must be voting for b with positive
probabiltiy. To see the logic, suppose not, so σb = 0. This implies that if a pivotal event occurs
it must be that all the b voters are informed independents, and hence the state is B. Therefore,
the best response is σB = 1, a contradiction. In addition, it is easy to show that there cannot
be an equilibrium.
As in the case with m = 0, if π = 12 or if π >
1
2 and p is suﬃciently large, then σa = 0. So the
only equilibrium involves mixing between b and abstention, so the equilibrium is characterized
by a single number, σb ∈ (0, 1]. In our experiment, we choose parameters such that σb ∈ (0, 1),
and σa = 0.
There are several comparative static properties the parameters of the model, m, p, n, π. For
example, the higher is the bias in favor of A, the higher is σb.
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II EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We use controlled laboratory experiments to evaluate the theoretical predictions. Once a specific
parametrization for n, m, and p is chosen, the model described and solved in the previous section
can be directly tested in the lab without changes. In all of the sessions fo the experiment we used
p = 0.25. We had two sessions each of two diﬀerent treatments for the probability distribution
of the state of the world: π = 1/2 and π = 5/9. Within each session subjects participated in
three diﬀerent treatments for partisan bias: m = 0, 6, and 12. The number of independents was
21 in three of the sessions and 17 in one session (with π = 1/2).
The symmetric undominated Bayesian equilibrium is unique for all parameter values used in
the experiment. For all elections, σa = 0. For all m = 0 elections, σφ = 1. For all elections with
m > 0, σb ∈ (0, 1). Specifically, the equilibrium predictions are: σb(π = 1/2;m = 6;n = 21) =
0.33; σb(π = 1/2;m = 12;n = 21) = 0.69; σb(π = 1/2;m = 6;n = 17) = 0.42; σb(π = 1/2;m =
12;n = 17) = 0.88; σb(π = 5/9;m = 6;n = 21) = 0.32; and σb(π = 5/9;m = 12;n = 21) = 0.69.
We contrast these with the decision theoretic predictions, based on naive voting, as for example
in Matsusaka (1995). According to the naive model, voters abstain unless there are consumption
benefits to voting, and these consumption benefits are independent of pivot probabilities. The
consumption benefits are derived from voting for a choice that yields the highest utility given
their prior beliefs about the state. In our experiment, the predictions of that model are: σφ = 1
for π = 1/2; and σa > σb = 0 for π = 5/9. Moreover, since voters are not strategic, σa is
independent from the number of partisans m.
The experiments were all conducted at the Center for Experimental Social Science at New
York University and used registered students from New York University.4 Four sessions were
conducted, three with 22 subjects and one with 18 subjects.5 No subject participated in more
than one session. Each session had three subsessions, each lasting 10 elections. All subsessions
used the same π, but diﬀerent values of m = 0, 6, and 12. We varied the sequence of m across
4The instructional and payment procedures are the same as described in Battaglini et al. (2007).
5We planned four 22-subject sessions, but were 4 subjects short in one of the sessions. In each session ione
subject was paid $20 to serve as a monitor.
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sessions to partially control for any sequencing or learning eﬀects. That is, for each value of π,
we conducted one session using the order (12, 6, 0) and one session using the order (0, 6, 12). In
the analysis that follows we label the first variation, Partisans First variation and the second
Partisans Last variation. In the two Partisans Last sessions and the Partisan First session
with π = 5/9, n = 21, but in the Partisan First session with π = 0.5, n = 17. We discuss the
implications of this diﬀerence below.
III EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
III.1 Aggregate Voter Choices
III.1.1 Informed Voters
Of the 2400 voting decisions we observed, in 618 cases (26 percent) subjects were informed,
that is, revealed a red or yellow ball. Across all treatments and sessions, these informed voters
chose 99 percent as predicted, 99.7 percent of the time if a voter revealed a red ball, he or she
voted for jar 1 (state A) and 98 percent of the time if a voter revealed a yellow ball, he or she
voted for jar 2 (state B). We interpret this as indicating that all subjects had a least a basic
comprehension of the task.
III.1.2 Uninformed Voters
Eﬀects of Treatments on Voter Choices Table 1 summarizes the choices of uninformed
voters as compared to the equilibrium predictions. In all treatments we find that uninformed
voters abstain in large percentages compared to informed voters and these diﬀerences are sig-
nificant. We also find strong evidence that the majority of uninformed voters alter their voting
choices as predicted by the swing voter’s curse theory and contrary to the decision-theoretic
theory. When m = 0, uninformed voters abstain in high percentages. However, with partisan
bias, uninformed voters reduce abstention and increase their probability of voting for b. The
changes are all statistically significant.6
6The t statistics are 12.64 and 4.19, respectively, for the case when π = 1/2 and 9.82 and 9.12, respectively,
for the case when π = 5/9.
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Table 1: Percent Uninformed Votes
Predicted in Parentheses
m Number a b Abstain
π = 1/2, n = 17
0 135 6 (0) 7 (0) 87 (100)
6 120 4 (0) 55 (42) 41 (58)
12 127 10 (0) 76 (86) 13 (17)
π = 1/2, n = 21
0 151 9 (0) 9 (0) 83 (100)
6 158 20 (0) 42 (33) 38 (67)
12 163 21 (0) 48 (69) 31 (31)
π = 5/9, n = 21
0 304 10 (0) 2 (0) 88 (100)
6 311 11 (0) 35 (32) 54 (68)
12 313 18 (0) 62 (69) 21 (31)
Session, Ordering, and Learning Eﬀects Figure 1 presents the average choices of
uninformed voters over time by session First observe that there are sharp changes in behavior
immediately following a change in partisan bias as shown in Table 1. Second, there appear to
be some diﬀerences related to the order of variation in partisans when π = 1/2: the probability
of voting for b is lower in the Partisans First treatment than in the Partisans Last treatment
for all values of m. However, this diﬀerence is only significant when m = 6 and m = 12.7
This diﬀerence is expected since in the Partisans First treatment there were less voters, n = 17,
compared to n = 21 in the Partisans Last session so the predicted probability of voting for b in
that session is greater and not surprisingly subjects are influenced by this change. We also find
diﬀerences between the two sessions when π = 5/9. In particular we see more voting in the
Partisans Last variation than in the Partisans First variation. When m = 0 uninformed voters
are significantly more likely to vote for b in the Partisans Last treatment than in the Partisans
First treatment.8 Furthermore, when m = 0 and 6, uninformed voters are significantly more
likely to vote for a in the Partisans Last variation. These diﬀerences appear to reflect diﬀerences
in ordering of the treatments.9
7The t statistics are 0.62, 2.09, and 5.12 for m = 0, 6, and 12, respectively.
8The t statistic is 1.92.
9The t statistics are 5.33 and 1.85 for m = 0 and 6, respectively.
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III.2 Eﬃciency of Choices
Our analysis of voting behavior provides support for the swing voter’s curse but also suggests
that many uninformed voters vote for a. This deviation from optimal behavior should have
consequences for eﬃciency, measured by the percentage of correct group decisions. In particular,
when there are partisans, it should lead to higher than expected eﬃciency in state A and lower
than expected eﬃciency in state B, with the latter eﬀect increasing in m. We find that this is
indeed the case. Across all treatments, we observe 100% eﬃciency in state A for all values of m
and both values of π, a small increase relative to the predicted. In contrast, when the true state
is B, we observe eﬃciencies of 97%, 89%, and 53% for the m = 0, 6, 12 treatments, respectively,
with no diﬀerence across the two π treatments. The eﬃciency diﬀerence between the m = 12
and the other m treatments in state B are significant at the 5% level. Thus, when there are
zero partisans, we find nearly perfect eﬃciency, but eﬃciency in state B falls oﬀ sharply with
the number of partisans.
Table 2 summarizes the mean eﬃciency results by the state of the world and treatment (with
ties coded as 0.5) with the mean predicted eﬃciency given the number of informed voters in
each period and predicted voting behavior.
9
Table 2 - Mean Eﬃciency by Treatment
Treatment State Cases Actual Predicted
π − 12 ,m = 0 State A 11 1 1
State B 9 1 1
π = 12 ,m = 6 State A 14 1 0.98
State B 6 0.83 0.99
π = 12 ,m = 12 State A 15 1 0.93
State B 5 0.50 0.98
π = 59 ,m = 0 State A 14 1 1
State B 6 0.92 1
π = 59 ,m = 6 State A 7 1 0.99
State B 13 0.92 0.98
π = 59 ,m = 12 State A 9 1 0.84
State B 11 0.55 0.98
IV CONCLUDING REMARKS
The central finding from this study is that most of the predictions of swing voter curse theory
hold up in large elections conducted under controlled laboratory conditions. There is signifi-
cant abstention, and significant balancing of partisans by uniformed voters; and vote balancing
increases with the partisan imbalance. Elections with no partisan imbalance successfully aggre-
gate information and lead to eﬃcient outcomes. Consistent with swing voter curse theory, this
eﬃciency falls oﬀ as partisan imbalance increases, but to a significantly greater extent than is
predicted in equilibrium.
It is instructive to compare these findings in large elections with results from the smaller
elections reported in Battaglini et al. (2007). All of the qualitative results are the same,
concerning the comparative statics, balancing, and abstention. One slight diﬀerence is that
there was less (irrational) voting for a in the small elections than in the large elections, except
for the π = 5/9 m = 0 treatment, where we observed 20% voting for a in the small elections,
compared with 10% voting for a in the large elections. These diﬀerences were reflected in slightly
diﬀerent eﬃciency results between small and large elections, with the comparisons mirroring the
diﬀerences in voting for a: more (irrational) a voting results in lower eﬃciency.
We conclude that this scaled-up study successfully replicates the initial swing voter’s curse
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experiment reported in Battaglini et al. (2007), obtaining very similar findings in laboratory
committees that are three times the size of those in the original study. The one caveat is that
we found evidence of a slight increase in irrational nonequilibrium behavior (voting for a) in the
larger elections. Whether this trend would continue as election size is further scaled up is an
open question.
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